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Abstract
We show that the consequences of historical warfare for state development differ for
Sub-Saharan Africa. We identify the locations of more than 1,500 conflicts in Africa, Asia,
and Europe from 1400 to 1799. We find that historical warfare predicts common-interest
states defined by high fiscal capacity and low civil conflict across much of the OldWorld.
For Sub-Saharan Africa, historical warfare predicts special-interest states defined by high
fiscal capacity and high civil conflict. Our results offer new evidence about where and
when “war makes states.”
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1 Introduction
State capacity matters for economic development (Besley and Persson, 2013, Dincecco and
Katz, 2014, Acemoglu et al., 2015). The success of Asian Tiger nations speaks to the economic
role that states can play (Wade, 1990, Evans, 1995, Kang, 2002). By contrast, poor nations
in Sub-Saharan Africa face problems of weak state infrastructure and political instability
(Migdal, 1988, Herbst, 2000, Bates, 2009).
But where does state capacity come from? A large literature argues that competition
between military rivals plays a key role in the development of state capacity (Tilly, 1975,
1992, Mann, 1986, Brewer, 1989, Downing, 1992, Besley and Persson, 2009). According to
this account, states undertake administrative reforms that increase extractive capacity and
allow them to finance military efforts. As fiscal and military strength grows, states are better
able to prevent civil war.
The standard account of warfare and state development centers on European history. Yet
it is not clear whether the logic of “war makes states” is universal. To illustrate, take Sub-
Saharan Africa. Region-specific factors including low population density (Herbst, 2000) and
colonization (Reid, 2014) may have thwarted the process by which warfare can build fis-
cal strength. Similarly, region-specific factors such as the transatlantic slave trade (Nunn,
2008) may have promoted the persistence of conflict. Beyond region-specific factors, the out-
comes of historical warfare themselves including “bad” political institutions (Hariri, 2012),
ethnic fractionalization (Whatley and Gillezeau, 2011), and lack of social trust (Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011) may have affected the state development process in Sub-Saharan Africa.
For such reasons, historical warfare may not predict greater extractive capacity or less civil
conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa in the ways that the standard account says that it should.
To better understand the origins of state capacity, this paper tests the relationship be-
tween historical warfare and state development across continents. We assemble new data
on the locations of more than 1,500 conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe between 1400 and
1799. We regress modern state development on historical warfare, a benchmark set of de-
mographic and geographic controls, and fixed effects for continents. We focus on two key
state development outcomes: fiscal capacity and civil conflict.
Our results offer new evidence about where and when “war makes states.” Using the ty-
pology of Besley and Persson (2011, 2015), we find that historical warfare predicts “common-
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interest” states defined by high fiscal capacity and low civil conflict across much of the
Old World. For Sub-Saharan Africa, historical warfare predicts “special-interest” states de-
fined by high fiscal capacity and high civil conflict. Our results suggest two revisions to the
conventional wisdom. First, political stability does not always appear to accompany fiscal
strength. Second, factors specific to Sub-Saharan Africa do not appear to wholly undermine
the process by which warfare can build fiscal strength.
Our empirical strategy includes continental fixed effects and a benchmark set of demo-
graphic and geographic controls. Still, it is possible that omitted variables (e.g., proximity to
waterways) that affect both historical warfare and state development explain our results. We
use two strategies to test this possibility. The first strategy is to control for other observable
country characteristics that are not likely to be outcomes of historical warfare themselves, in-
cluding initial conditions (e.g., technological adoption), geographical features (e.g., malaria
risk), colonial and legal origins, and artificial borders. We find that our results are robust to
controls for these other observable characteristics. The second strategy is to test how likely it
is that unobservable country characteristics explain our results. For half of the reported spec-
ifications, we find that including a “full” set of controls increases the size of our estimates.
For the other half, we find that, to explain away our results, the influence of unobservable
features would have to be on average many times larger than the influence of the observed
controls. This strategy provides further evidence that unobservable features cannot fully
explain our results. We also perform a variety of other robustness checks. For example, we
show that our results are robust to sample changes (e.g., including NewWorld conflicts and
countries). Similarly, we show evidence for intermediate state development outcomes.
Finally, we test for mechanisms that may help explain why the relationship between
historical warfare and state development differs for Sub-Saharan Africa. We focus on three
potential outcomes of historical warfare: political institutions, ethnic fractionalization, and
social trust. Our results suggest that social trust is one mechanism that may help explain
why conflict persists in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3
discusses the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and main results. Section 5
performs robustness checks. Section 6 tests for mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 Conceptual Framework
This section performs two tasks. First, we describe the standard account of warfare and
state development in European history (Tilly, 1975, 1992). We focus on two key implications
of the standard account regarding fiscal capacity and civil conflict. Second, we discuss Sub-
Saharan Africa in light of the standard account. We describe contrasting views in the African
history literature about whether the standard account can apply to this region. This lack of
scholarly consensus motivates our empirical analysis.
2.1 Warfare and State Development
Tilly (1992, table 3.1) estimates that major powers in Europe were at war 78 to 95 percent
of all years from 1500 to 1800. Rulers saw clear upsides from military victory, including
royal glory, but faced few risks from defeat (Cox, 2011). Battle loss did not generally cost
rulers their thrones until 1800, when Napoleon began to replace monarchs that were de-
feated (Hoffman, 2012). Rulers thus had incentives to launch frequent wars.
To defend against survival threats from rivals, states made fiscal innovations that secured
new and more regular sources of taxation (Tilly, 1975, 1992). Mann (1986) shows that major
increases in revenues in England from 1688 to 1815 correspond with the onset of wars. Gen-
naioli and Voth (2014) find a positive and significant relationship between interstate conflicts
and state consolidation in Europe between 1500 and 1800. Dincecco and Prado (2012) show
that fiscal capacity today is greater for countries that fought more wars between 1816 and
1913.
The “ratchet effect” is one mechanism through which fiscal innovations may persist over
time (Rasler and Thompson, 1985). Expanding and regularizing tax systems involves fixed
costs. Once states have established stronger fiscal institutions, the marginal costs of sustain-
ing them can be low. Thus, greater wartime tax revenues may not fall to pre-war levels once
conflict ends. If external threats are recurrent, then fiscal capacity may increase in ratchet-
like steps.
Interstate military competition may eventually create the conditions for domestic po-
litical stability (Tilly, 1992). Bates (2009) describes two mechanisms through which early
modern states could reduce civil violence: repression and enticement. As fiscal and mili-
tary strength grew, states were better able to impose widespread security. Monarchs could
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enforce local peace agreements and demilitarize rural warlords. They could also co-opt
local elites through court favors and privileges. The establishment of parliaments was an-
other way to give local elites a stake in the state’s success. Thus, we may observe the “anti-
persistence” of civil conflict over the long run (Fearon and Laitin, 2014).
The standard account of warfare and state development yields two key implications.
First, historical warfare should produce greater fiscal capacity today. Second, it should re-
duce civil conflict. Thus, in the typology of Besley and Persson (2011, 2015), the standard
account implies that historical warfare should predict “common-interest” states.
2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa
A first set of views in the African history literature supports the standard account that “war
makes states.” Herbst (2000) argues that the consequences of warfare for state development
in pre-colonial Africa were muted, not because of a flaw in the “war makes states” argu-
ment, but because there was simply less conflict than in early modern Europe. Still, Bates
(2014) finds a positive relationship between military competition and state centralization
in Sub-Saharan Africa during the pre-colonial period. Furthermore, there is evidence that
the legacy of early political structures persists over time. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) show that state centralization in pre-colonial Africa
predicts public goods provision and economic development today. Similarly, Depetris-
Chauvin (2014) finds that pre-colonial state strength reduces current civil conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Thies (2007) shows a positive link between military rivalry and extractive
capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1975 and 2000.
A second set of views contends that the standard account of war-related state building
cannot apply to Sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars point to at least three region-specific factors
that make Sub-Saharan Africa distinct from other parts of the Old World: political geogra-
phy, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialization.
A first factor is political geography. Population density in 1500 was 14 people/sq km in
Europe, 8 people/sq km in the Ottoman Empire, 13 people/sq km in China, and 46 peo-
ple/sq km in Japan, but only 2 people/sq km in Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst, 2000, table
1.1). In this land-rich but labor-scarce environment, the main goal of warfare was to capture
people rather than territory. Thornton (1999, p. 16) writes: “Indeed, ownership of slaves
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in Africa was virtually equivalent to owning land in Western Europe or China.” The most
common type of pre-colonial conflict, called the raiding war, reflects Sub-Saharan Africa’s
political geography. In contrast to the European-style campaigning war, defined by large-
scale operations and set-piece battles, the raiding war was characterized by repeat assaults
on the enemy (Reid, 2012). This type of warfare did not conclude with final surrender, cre-
ating the potential for open-ended conflict (Klein, 1972).
A second factor is the transatlantic slave trade. Curtin (1975) and Eltis (1987) argue that
the slave trade was an outgrowth of pre-colonial conflicts over people. Others claim that
the combination of the New World demand for slaves and a new gunpowder technology
– known as the gun-slave cycle – increased raiding wars and slave exports (Rodney, 1972,
Inikori, 1982, Law, 1991, Whatley, 2012). Fenske and Kala (2014) show that, in regions that
became dependent on slave exports, disruptions to the slave trade produced short-run and
long-lasting increases in intra-African conflict.
A third factor is European colonialization. The “Scramble for Africa” began in the 1880s
and lasted through the start of World War I. Reid (2014) argues that there was a nineteenth-
century military revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa akin to the military revolution in early
modern Europe. The colonial peace prevented this revolution from running its natural
course, creating conditions for persistent conflict (Reid, 2014). Another argument highlights
the borders that colonial powers established, which did not correspond with pre-colonial
borders. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) show that civil conflict in Africa today
is greater in areas where ethnic groups were partitioned by colonizers. Similarly, Fearon
and Laitin (2014) find that post-1945 civil conflict in Africa is greater in places that saw
nineteenth-century colonial wars.
Political geography, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialization are all reasons why
we may not observe the “anti-persistence” of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Beyond
such region-specific factors, the outcomes of historical warfare themselves may explain why
Sub-Saharan Africa may differ in this regard. A first potential outcome is “bad” political
institutions. Autocracy was the traditional mode of rule for pre-colonial states outside of
Europe (Hariri, 2012). Early states were either strong enough to prevent colonization, or
were colonized under indirect rule, whichmay have strengthened local autocrats (Mamdani,
1996). Thus, early statehood can translate into autocracy today (Hariri, 2012). States that lack
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democratic institutions may be more likely to witness political violence (Besley and Persson,
2011). A second potential outcome is ethnic fractionalization. Whatley and Gillezeau (2011)
argue that the transatlantic slave trademade Africans more valuable as slaves than as citizen
taxpayers. Thus, there was a greater incentive by social groups to conduct slave raids and
less incentive to strengthen states. A key consequence of the slave trade was the creation
of smaller and more independent villages, which promoted ethnic divisions (Whatley and
Gillezeau, 2011). There is a large literature that links ethnic fragmentation with civil con-
flict (e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). A third potential outcome is a lack of social
trust. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) argue that social groups with a history of fighting
can be less trustful of each other. A lack of social trust can translate into greater civil conflict,
particularly if social groups used violence to produce slaves for export (Nunn, 2008, Nunn
and Wantchekon, 2011, Fenske and Kala, 2015).1 Bates (2008) and Reid (2012) argue that
pre-colonial warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa has important consequences for civil conflict to-
day. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) show econometric evidence that greater pre-colonial
conflict in Africa is linked with greater post-colonial conflict.2
Our discussion indicates that there is scholarly debate about the extent to which the
standard account of warfare and state development can apply to Sub-Saharan Africa. To
frame this debate in the typology of Besley and Persson (2011, 2015), historical warfare may
not predict “common-interest” states defined by high fiscal capacity and low civil conflict
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, it may predict “special-interest” states defined by high fiscal
capacity and high civil conflict, or “weak” states defined by low fiscal capacity and high civil
conflict.3 Our empirical analysis will test between these contrasting views in the literature.
1Furthermore, conflict experience can endow ethnic groups with “martial institutions,” which may be passed
from one generation to the next and make conflict more likely to persist (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012).
2Boone (2014) argues that land-related conflicts in modern-day Africa can actually be an outcome of state-
building efforts. Heldring (2014) finds that greater state capacity led to more conflict in 1990s Rwanda.
3Acemoglu et al. (2010) offer one explanation for how high fiscal capacity and high civil conflict can co-exist.
When fiscal capacity is high, the military will gain greater economic power if it undertakes a coup. To reduce
the likelihood of a coup, the civilian government has an incentive to limit military strength, which reduces
the state’s monopoly on security and makes it more likely that civil conflict will persist.
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3 Data
3.1 Historical Conflict
Our historical conflict data are from Brecke (1999). This unique database provides a com-
prehensive list of violent conflicts worldwide from 1400 to the present. To compile this
database, Brecke uses roughly 80 sources, including dictionaries and encyclopedias, schol-
arly books and compilations, and non-English language works (in Chinese, Japanese, and
Russian). For Sub-Saharan Africa, Brecke’s sources include Freeman-Grenville (1973), Ajayi
and Crowder (1985), and McEvedy (1995).
Brecke’s database defines violent conflict according to Cioffi-Revilla (1996).4 Brecke’s
database includes all recorded violent conflicts with amagnitude of 1.5 or higher on Richard-
son’s (1960) base-10 log conflict scale. As a review of Brecke’s source materials will attest,
external conflicts (i.e., conflicts that take place between states, broadly defined) form the
basis of his database.
For each conflict, Brecke’s database lists belligerents and years, along with supporting
information. For example, one entry reads “Akramu-Accra (Ghana), 1660.” We use this in-
formation to identify the modern country in which each conflict took place (in this example,
Ghana). To improve accuracy, we double-check the history of each conflict with the sec-
ondary literature. Another entry reads “England-France, 1475.” This entry refers to Edward
IV’s invasion of Calais. We thereby code this conflict for France. While it is true that this
coding scheme overlooks conflicts that are fought outside a country’s soil, but which may
still increase that country’s fiscal capacity (e.g., England in 1475), we view it as the most
straightforward way to operationalize the argument that external threats drove institutional
reforms. We focus on historical warfare in the Old World: conflicts on the continents of
Africa, Asia (including the Middle East), and Europe. Our regression analysis will include
the Americas as a robustness check.
Scholars have made wide use of Brecke’s database. Iyigun (2008) tests the effects of
Ottoman military engagements on Catholic-Protestant conflicts in European history. Parker
4This definition is: “An occurrence of purposive and lethal violence among 2+ social groups pursuing conflict-
ing political goals that results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the command
of authoritative leadership. The state does not have to be an actor. Data can include massacres of unarmed
civilians or territorial conflicts between warlords.”
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(2008) and Zhang et al. (2011) link climate change to the seventeenth-century global “crisis”
of state breakdowns. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) test the historical legacy of conflict
in Africa. Fearon and Laitin (2014) study conflict persistence from 1816 onward. Other
scholars that use Brecke’s database include Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011), Pinker
(2011), Lagerlo¨f (2014), and Morris (2014).
Brecke’s database may not record all historical conflicts. Still, the scale and scope of
Brecke’s databasemakes it likely that it includes themost important conflicts as documented
by historians. A related concern is that the quality of historical data may differ across world
regions. For example, the literature on historical warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa is small
(Reid, 2014). Furthermore, the nature of African warfare – raiding wars versus European-
style campaigning wars – may make it less amenable to documentation. For these reasons,
Brecke’s database may not adequately record all African conflicts. However, any attempt to
add conflicts from other sources would be selective, because most available sources have a
regional focus (e.g., Thornton, 1999). To help account for differences in data quality across
world regions, our regression analysis will always include continental fixed effects.
There are two reasons why we code conflicts according to modern borders (Fearon and
Laitin, 2014). First, given that our goal is to better understand cross-country variation in
current state development, it makes sense to take modern nation-states as our unit of anal-
ysis. Second, the country-level approach is feasible. Many of the covariates that we want to
include in our analysis – both historically and today – are only available at this level. En-
dogenous borders that emerge as a response to conflict outcomes do not present a problem
for our analysis, because we fix modern borders and project them backward in time. Thus,
the measurement of contemporary and historical variables for each country rely upon the
same borders.5
Our main historical conflict variable computes the share of years from 1400 to 1799 in
which a country experienced conflict on its soil. This measure of historical conflict is widely
comparable across countries.6 We focus on the pre-1800 period because we want to test for
5This approach is similar to dividing continents into square grids (e.g., 100 x 100 km). As described, an advan-
tage of using modern borders is that far more covariates are available at the country level than at the grid cell
level.
6Large conflicts may lead to greater fiscal reforms than small conflicts. To measure conflict intensity, one could
use casualty totals (Dincecco and Prado, 2012), but these data are only available for about one-third of Brecke’s
conflicts. A second possibility is to incorporate conflict durations in days or months. However, precise start
and end dates are not available for over 70 percent of the Brecke data.
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the legacy of “pre-colonial” conflicts. Namely, we want to exclude nineteenth-century colo-
nial wars related to the Scramble for Africa. We compute two alternative historical conflict
variables. The first computes the number of distinct conflicts that a country experienced on
its soil between 1400 and 1799. The second computes the share of years over this period in
which a country experienced the start of conflict on its soil.
Table 1 summarizes the historical conflict data.7 1,661 recorded conflicts took place from
1400 to 1799, for an average of 415 per century. Consistent with the state formation literature,
Europe saw the most warfare over this period (810 conflicts), followed by Asia (523), Sub-
Saharan Africa (230), and North Africa (98). Figure 1 maps these conflicts.
3.2 Fiscal Capacity
We take our main variable, the share of direct (i.e., income, social security, payroll, and
property) taxes in total taxes, from Dincecco and Prado (2012). These data are averaged
over the 1990s (data from the 2000s are not as widely available).
There are several reasons why the direct tax share is a particularly meaningful measure
of fiscal capacity. Lindert (2004) and Besley and Persson (2013) note a striking similarity
between the historical evolution of fiscal systems and current differences in fiscal systems
between rich and poor countries. As states developed stronger fiscal systems over time,
there was a shift from indirect taxes such as trade taxes toward direct taxes such as income
taxes. The collection of direct taxes requires greater administrative capacity to effectively
monitor and enforce tax payments than does the collection of indirect taxes such as customs
taxes at ports. Furthermore, rich countries today depend to a greater extent on direct taxes
than do poor countries, which rely heavily on trade taxes (Besley and Persson, 2013). The
reliance on trade taxes by African governments has generated inadequate revenues both
historically and today, making it difficult for African states to provide basic public goods
and services such as security, school books, and roads that promote development (Herbst,
2000).
We use three alternative fiscal capacity variables from Besley and Persson (2011). These
data are taken from 1999. The first alternative is the share of income taxes in total taxes.
This measure is similar in spirit to our main variable. The second alternative is income
7These statistics use the conflict start variable to avoid double-counting, since some conflicts spill over from
one century into the next.
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tax bias, computed as the difference between the income tax share and the trade tax share.
This variable represents another way to measure fiscal capacity. The third alternative is
government size, measured as the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP.
3.3 Civil Conflict
We take our civil conflict variables from Besley and Persson (2011). Our main variable com-
putes the share of years from 1950 to 2000 in which a country experienced a civil war, as
counted for each year in which conflict deaths of the government and/or its domestic ad-
versary exceed 1,000. A set of two alternative variables incorporates purges, as defined by
at least one murder of a political opponent by the standing government in the span of one
year. Combining these data sources, Besley and Persson generate two variables for political
violence: an ordered variable that equals 0 for years of peace, 1 for years of purges without
civil war, and 2 for years of both purges and civil wars; and a dummy variable that equals
1 if the ordered variable equals 1 or 2. We use these variables to compute average scores for
political violence between 1945 and 2000.
4 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
4.1 Empirical Strategy
We use OLS to estimate:
yi = α+ βCon f licti + δCon f licti × A f rica+ x
′
iγ+ µj + ǫi, (1)
where i indexes countries. yi denotes one of our four measures of fiscal capacity or one of
our three measures of civil conflict. Con f licti is one of our three measures of historical con-
flict. Con f licti × A f rica interacts historical conflict with a dummy variable for Sub-Saharan
Africa. xi is a vector of baseline controls to be described ahead. µj are a full set of fixed ef-
fects for continents (Asia, Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa). ǫi are robust standard
errors. Our coefficients of interest are β, the estimated relationship between historical war-
fare and current fiscal capacity or civil conflict for the rest of the Old World (Asia, Europe,
and North Africa), and δ, the estimated relationship between historical warfare and current
fiscal capacity or civil conflict for Sub-Saharan Africa relative to the impact for the rest of the
Old World.
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The vector xi denotes a benchmark set of controls that we include in all regressions. We
select benchmark controls that are unlikely to be shaped by developments after 1500 (Ashraf
and Galor, 2011). To account for initial demographic conditions, we include log population
density in 1500 and the log timing of the Neolithic Revolution, defined to have taken place
when a majority of the country’s population began to practice sedentary agriculture as the
primary mode of subsistence. To account for country-level geographic features, we always
include log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and total land area. Table
A1 displays the descriptive statistics for the regression variables.
4.2 Main Results
Table 2 presents our estimates for the relationship between historical warfare and fiscal ca-
pacity. As described, all regressions include a full set of continental dummies and the bench-
mark set of controls. Column 1 shows the result for our main fiscal capacity variable, the
direct tax share. The estimated coefficients for the rest of the OldWorld and for Sub-Saharan
Africa are both positive and statistically significant.8
Columns 2 to 4 use our alternative fiscal capacity variables: the income tax share, income
tax bias, and government size (i.e., the tax-to-GDP ratio). The results for the income tax share
(column 2) and income tax bias (column 3) are similar to column 1. There is a positive and
significant correlation between historical warfare and fiscal capacity for the rest of the Old
World and for Sub-Saharan Africa. The result for government size (column 4) is also similar,
even if the coefficient for Con f licti loses significance in this specification. Furthermore, now
the coefficient for Con f licti × A f rica does not significantly differ from the rest of the Old
World. Taken together, these results suggest that the main consequence of historical warfare
is for fiscal capacity, rather than for overall state size.9
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the column 1 specification for our alternative historical conflict
8The main results in Tables 2 and 3 do not change if we include interaction terms for Asia and North Africa
(relative to Europe, the omitted category). The coefficients for Con f licti × Asia are never significant. The
coefficient for Con f licti × NorthA f rica is negative and significant for the main fiscal capacity specification
and positive and significant for the main civil conflict specification. Furthermore, the main results remain
robust if we code historical conflict as log(1+ Con f licti) to reduce the influence of outliers.
9For robustness, we use two non-fiscal alternatives. The first is the government anti-diversion score according
to the International Country Risk Guide (2010). This measure averages the index scores in 1997 (the last avail-
able year) for the following categories: law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation,
and government repudiation of contracts. The second is the Brookings Institution state weakness score ac-
cording to Rice and Patrick (2008). In both cases, the coefficient for Con f licti remains positive and significant,
while the coefficient for Con f licti × A f rica is not significantly different from the rest of the Old World.
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variables: the number of conflicts between 1400 and 1799, and the share of years in which a
country experienced the start of conflict. The results are again positive and significant.10
Table 3 presents our estimates for the relationship between historical warfare and civil
conflicts. Column 1 uses our main variable, the share of years of civil war between 1950
and 2000. Columns 2 and 3 use our alternative variables for average political violence (or-
dered and dummy). Columns 4 and 5 repeat the column 1 specification for the alternative
historical conflict variables as described before. The results are robust across all specifica-
tions. The estimated coefficients for Sub-Saharan Africa are always positive and statistically
significant, while the estimated coefficients for the rest of the Old World are not (with the
exception of column 4, in which the point estimate for Con f licti is negative and significant).
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The results in Tables 2 and 3 support the argument that historical warfare has significant
consequences for state development. We find a positive correlation between historical war-
fare and current fiscal capacity across the Old World, including in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
estimates from column 1 of Table 2 indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the
share of years of historical conflict for a country in the rest of the Old World is associated
with a 0.436 standard deviation increase in the share of tax revenues that it gathers from di-
rect taxes. For Sub-Saharan Africa, a one standard deviation increase in the share of years of
historical conflict translates into a 1.502 standard deviation increase in the direct tax share.
By contrast, the positive correlation between historical warfare and civil conflict today that
we find for Sub-Saharan Africa, and for this region only, suggests that Africa is different.
Our estimate from column 1 of Table 3 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
the share of years of historical conflict is associated with a 0.444 standard deviation increase
in post-1950 civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. For the rest of the Old World, our results
show evidence consistent with the “anti-persistence” of conflict.
The typology in Besley and Persson (2011, 2015) provides an intuitive way to interpret
our results. We find that historical warfare predicts “common-interest” states defined by
high fiscal capacity and low civil conflict across much of the Old World. For Sub-Saharan
10The main results in Tables 2 and 3 remain robust if we control for historical conflicts fought in neighboring
countries. The coefficients for neighboring conflicts are never significant.
11For robustness, we estimate the specification in column 1 of Table 3 for a similar sample as our main fiscal
capacity variable (the civil conflict and fiscal capacity variables overlap for 67 out of 70 total observations).
The results are qualitatively identical to the reported results; the point estimate for Con f licti × A f rica is
larger than before.
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Africa, we find that historical warfare predicts “special-interest” states high fiscal capacity
and high civil conflict.
5 Robustness
The significant correlations that we document in the previous section are consistent with the
argument that historical warfare is linked with greater fiscal capacity across the Old World,
including in Sub-Saharan Africa. We also document a feature of historical warfare that is
particular to Sub-Saharan Africa: conflict persistence. However, these correlations could be
explained by omitted variables that influence both historical warfare and state development
outcomes today. For example, if other geographical features such as terrain ruggedness
influence patterns of historical warfare, and if such features have implications for current
fiscal capacity or civil conflict, then they could generate a positive relationship between
historical conflict and current outcomes.
In this section, we use two strategies to test the robustness of our results. First, we control
for a range of observable country characteristics beyond our baseline controls that may be
correlated with historical warfare and state development outcomes today. Second, we test
how likely it is that our results are driven by unobservable country features. We also test
whether our estimates are robust to sample changes and show evidence for intermediate
outcomes.
5.1 Further Controls for Observables
Table 4 presents our estimates for historical warfare and fiscal capacity with additional con-
trols. We start with a parsimonious specification. To show that our main results do not
depend on the benchmark set of controls, column 1 excludes them from the benchmark
specification (we retain the full set of continental fixed effects). The coefficients for β and δ
are similar as before.
Different forms of colonial rule by Europeans, rather than pre-colonial conflict, may pre-
dict fiscal capacity outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa today. Column 2 adds colonial dummies
for British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and other European colonizers according to Nunn
and Puga (2012) to the benchmark specification that includes a full set of continental dum-
mies and the benchmark set of controls. The results for both the rest of the Old World and
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for Sub-Saharan Africa closely resemble the benchmark case (i.e., column 1 of Table 2).
Column 3 repeats this specification for a key feature related to colonial rule: the creation
of artificial borders. We control for this feature according to Alesina et al. (2011), who mea-
sure the straightness of a country’s land borders. Borders that resemble straight lines are
likely to be artificially drawn, while borders that resemble uneven lines are likely to corre-
spond with natural features (e.g., rivers). The results remain robust to this control.
Column 4 repeats this specification for legal origins, another feature related to colonial
rule. We include dummy variables for British and French legal origins according to Ashraf
and Galor (2011). The results are again similar.12
Our baseline set of controls includes two measures of initial conditions: log population
density in 1500 and the log timing of the Neolithic Revolution. It may be the case that
initial technology influenced both the likelihood of historical conflicts and the development
of fiscal capacity. To account for initial technological conditions, we include a measure of
technological adoption in 1500 from Comin et al. (2010). Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) link pre-colonial state centralization in Africa with
better public goods provision and economic performance today. Initial state strength may
have also influenced the ability of states in Sub-Saharan Africa to survive colonialization
(Englebert, 2000). To account for pre-colonial state centralization, we include a measure of
state antiquity in 1500 according to Bockstette et al. (2002). Column 5 shows the results with
these additional controls. The coefficient estimates remain robust, even though the number
of observations falls from 70 to 49 due to a lack of available data.13
Column 6 repeats this analysis for additional geographic controls beyond those included
in our benchmark set (i.e., log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and total
land area). Specifically, we add controls for the share of a country’s population at risk for
malaria, the population share that lives in tropical zones, the average distance to the nearest
12To the extent that the particular form of colonial rule influences post-independence interventions by past
colonizers (e.g., the relationship between Benin and France), then the colonizer dummies account for this
possibility. For robustness, we control for two other features that help proxy for the autonomy of newly-
independent nations. To account for Cold War alliances, we control for vote affinity with the United States
across roll-call votes in the UN General Assembly between 1946-1989 according to Strezhnev and Voeten
(2013). To proxy for leadership quality, we control for the share of years between 1946-2000 for which a
nation’s leader is highly educated according to Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011). The main results in Tables
4 and 5 are robust to both controls.
13To account for the historical role of indigenous slavery in Sub-Saharan Africa, we include the variable from
Bezemer et al. (2014). The main results in Tables 4 and 5 are robust to this control.
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waterway (sea-navigable river or coast), the average distance to the nearest coast, terrain
ruggedness, the share of land that is desert, and a proxy for natural resource wealth (i.e.,
gem diamond extraction) according to Ashraf and Galor (2011) and Nunn and Puga (2012).
The results continue to hold. The point estimate for Con f licti × A f rica falls by nearly one-
half, but is still significant.14
Column 7 includes all of the controls described in columns 2 to 6, with the exception of
the variables for other initial conditions, which we exclude because the number of observa-
tions is small. The results resemble the previous specification in terms of magnitude and
significance.15
Table 5 repeats the robustness checks with additional controls for historical warfare and
civil conflicts. The coefficient values for Sub-Saharan Africa are always positive and signif-
icant in columns 1 through 7, with point estimates similar in magnitude to the benchmark
case (i.e., column 1 of Table 3). As for the main results, the coefficients for the rest of the
world are never significant.16
While the addition of new controls cannot rule out omitted variable concerns, the results
are robust. This exercise reinforces our main results, namely that there is a positive and
significant relationship between historical warfare and fiscal capacity throughout the Old
World, including in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that historical conflicts predict current civil
wars, but only in Sub-Saharan Africa.
14For robustness, we add two other geographic controls. Iliffe (2007, ch. 2) suggests that border zones between
forests and savannas in Africa could be prone to more conflict. To proxy for ecological diversity, we compute
one minus the Herfindahl index of the different ecological zones in each country according to GAEZ (Fischer
et al., 2000, plate 55). To further control for natural resource wealth, we include average oil production
between 1980-2012 according to the U.S. EIA (2013). The main results in Tables 4 and 5 are unchanged in
both cases. Finally, to the extent that geography (e.g., terrain ruggedness) influences the type of colonial
independence movement (Garcia-Ponce and Wantchekon, 2014), then the geographic controls account for
this possibility.
15As alternative way to control for unobservables, we include fixed effects for macro-geographical regions
according to the UN Statistics Division. The UN lists 22 macro-geographical regions worldwide, 14 of which
are in our sample. The main results in Tables 4 and 5 remain robust.
16Our results suggest that conflict locations in Sub-Saharan Africa persist from the pre-colonial period to the
present. Ideally, we want to know whether the same groups that fought in the past continue to fight today.
To proxy for migration patterns, we control for a country’s share of foreign migrants in total population in
1960 as compiled by Ashraf and Galor (2011). The main result in Table 5 is robust to this control.
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5.2 Potential Bias from Unobservables
Even though we control for a wide variety of potential omitted variables, the results in
Tables 4 and 5 could still be biased by unobservable features that influence both historical
warfare and modern state development. To address this concern, we compute a measure
based on Altonji et al. (2005), Bellows and Miguel (2009), and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
that estimates how much greater the influence of any unobservable features would have to
be, relative to the observed controls, to fully explain away the previous set of results.
Specifically, this measure computes the ratio βˆ f/(βˆr − βˆ f ) according to the coefficients
for our variables of interest (Con f licti and Con f licti × A f rica) for two regressions, the first
of which includes the covariates for a “restricted” set of controls (which we label βˆr), and the
second of which includes the covariates for a “full” set of controls (which we label βˆ f ). The
logic is that, the greater the ratio, the larger that selection on unobservable features must be
to fully explain away our estimates.
We test two sets of restricted covariates. The first includes no controls, and the second
our benchmark set of controls. We test five sets of full covariates: (1) the baseline set of
controls, (2) colonial origins, (3) legal origins, (4) other initial conditions, and (5) additional
geographic controls. These sets of covariates are described in the previous section. We
test (1) for the specification in which the restricted set of covariates includes no controls,
and (2) to (5) for the specification in which the restricted set includes the benchmark set of
controls. In total, there are five combinations of restricted and full covariates for which we
can calculate ratios.
Table 6 presents the ratios for our main fiscal capacity and conflict variables for Con f licti
(Panel A) and Con f licti × A f rica (Panel B). Out of the 20 reported ratios, only one is less
than one (i.e., for Con f licti when the dependent variable is the civil war share; this coeffi-
cient is generally not significant in Tables 3 and 5). 10 of the 20 ratios are negative, which
indicates that the coefficients of interest, Con f licti and Con f licti × A f rica, actually increase
in magnitude once the full set of covariates is included. The remaining 9 ratios range in
value from 1.10 to 34.69, with the median equal to 20.92 when the dependent variable is
the direct tax share and 17.87 when the dependent variable is the civil war share. The latter
set of results suggests that, to fully explain away the positive correlation between histori-
cal warfare and fiscal capacity (civil conflict) today, the influence of unobservable features
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would have to be on average 19 times greater (18 times greater) than observable features.
We view this exercise as further evidence that unobservable features cannot fully explain
our estimates.
5.3 Alternative Samples
As another set of robustness checks, we re-run our main specifications for a variety of dif-
ferent samples.
The Scramble for Africa by European colonizers did not begin until the late nineteenth
century. Still, white settler communities in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., in South Africa) began
in the eighteenth century. To account for the potential role of eighteenth-century colonialism
in Sub-Saharan Africa, columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 exclude eighteenth-century wars and
recompute our main historical conflict variable for 1400 to 1700. The key estimates for fiscal
capacity (column 1) and civil conflict (column 2) are similar in magnitude and significance
as the benchmark case. As an alternative strategy, columns 3 and 4 exclude South Africa, the
most prominent white settler community. The results are also robust to this sample change.
Russia and China saw much greater conflict between 1400 and 1799 than other sample
countries (Figure 1).17 Columns 5 and 6 exclude Russia and China from the main specifica-
tions. The results are again robust. The point estimate for Con f licti × A f rica falls for civil
conflicts (column 6), but remains significant.
Columns 7 and 8 add in conflicts and countries in the Americas, for which Brecke (1999)
records 97 conflicts from 1400 to 1799. The point estimate for the coefficient for Con f licti falls
by nearly one-half for fiscal capacity (column 9), but remains significant, which suggests that
the logic of “war makes states” may also apply to the NewWorld. This result complements
Thies (2005), who finds a positive relationship between interstate rivalry and fiscal capacity
in twentieth-century Latin America. The other key estimates continue to hold.18
Finally, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014, pp. 327-8) note that Angola is important to their
cross-country results for conflict persistence in Africa. The coefficient for Con f licti × A f rica
17Direct tax share data are not available for China. However, data for China for the three alternative fiscal
capacity variables tested in Table 2 are available.
18The results for Con f licti and for Con f licti × A f rica are similar in magnitude and significance if we exclude
countries in Europe and re-run our main specifications for fiscal capacity and civil conflict. The main differ-
ence is that the coefficient value for Con f licti, while still larger, is no longer significant in the fiscal capacity
specification. However, we lose over 40 observations in this specification.
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remains large but loses significance when we exclude Angola from the main civil conflict
specification (result not shown). However, Besley and Reynal-Querol study the whole of
Africa rather than Sub-Saharan Africa only. If we follow this approach and code the interac-
tion term for Africa as a whole, then the coefficient for Con f licti× A f rica remains significant
at the 10 percent level when we exclude Angola from the main civil conflict specification (re-
sult not shown). Furthermore, the qualitative evidence strongly supports the view for con-
flict persistence in Angola. Henderson (1979, ch. 3) argues that civil conflict in Angola has
deep historical roots, writing: “We can conclude...that the slave trade was the single most
important cause of conflict during 400 years of Angola’s history (p. 98).” Similarly, Chabal
(2008) highlights the relationship between pre-colonial power structures and modern civil
conflict in Angola.
5.4 Intermediate Outcomes
As a final robustness check, we show evidence that historical warfare influences state de-
velopment outcomes at an intermediate point in time. This evidence suggests that the rela-
tionships that we document between historical warfare and current state development are
not just arbitrary correlations between some historical events and some modern outcomes
(Austin, 2008).
For the intermediate outcome for fiscal capacity, we use cumulative railway kilometers
built by 1910, just prior to the start of World War I, according to Mitchell (2007a,b,c). We
view this measure as a proxy for the “infrastructural power” of the state (Mann, 1986). This
variable has the key advantage over fiscal variables of being widely available across sample
countries. For the intermediate outcome for civil conflict, we use the share of years from
1850 to 1899 in which Sub-Saharan African countries experienced intra-African conflict (i.e.,
conflict inwhich all belligerents were African) according to Fenske andKala (2014). We focus
on Sub-Saharan Africa for this outcome because our previous analysis does not detect any
significant relationship between historical and current civil conflict outside of this region.
We exclude the 1900-13 period because the colonial peace leaves no variation in intra-African
conflicts.
Table 8 presents OLS estimates for the intermediate outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 show the
results for the intermediate fiscal capacity outcome, log railway kilometers in 1910. The es-
timated coefficients are positive and significant for the rest of the Old World whether or not
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we include colonial dummies. There is no systematic relationship for Sub-Saharan Africa,
which may suggest that European colonizers built railways at the start of their rule regard-
less of the strength of pre-colonial states. Columns 3 and 4 repeat this analysis for the in-
termediate conflict outcome, intra-African conflicts from 1850 to 1899. The coefficients are
again positive and significant.19
6 Mechanisms
The evidence in Sections 4 and 5 supports our argument that historical warfare significantly
influences state development today. More historical warfare is correlated with greater fiscal
capacity throughout the Old World. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa – and only there –
more historical warfare is also correlated with greater civil conflict.
In this section, we test for mechanisms that may help explain why the relationship be-
tween historical warfare and state development differs for Sub-Saharan Africa. The concep-
tual framework in Section 2 guides the specific mechanisms that we test. We focus on three
potential outcomes of historical warfare: political institutions, ethnic fractionalization, and
social trust.20 The idea is as follows. We add these variables one-by-one as controls to our
main specifications for fiscal capacity and civil conflict. If these controls affect the magni-
tudes of our coefficients of interest, then we can think of them asmechanisms throughwhich
historical warfare influences state development (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 9 present the results of this analysis for our main fiscal capac-
ity variable. The coefficient values for Con f licti and Con f licti × A f rica remain similar in
magnitude and significance after including controls for political institutions and ethnic frac-
tionalization. However, the point estimate for Con f licti × A f rica falls to 2.812 and loses
significance for the specification that controls for social trust. This result suggests that social
trust may be one mechanism through which historical conflict influences fiscal development
in Sub-Saharan Africa. We interpret this result with caution, because the number of coun-
tries for which trust data are available is small (i.e., 47 observations) and differs from the
19The results are similar in magnitude and significance if we use all conflicts fought in Sub-Saharan Africa
between 1850 and 1899 rather than only intra-African conflicts.
20Political institutions is the share of years of parliamentary democracy from 1945 to 2000 according to Besley
and Persson (2011). Ethnic fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group
shares circa 2001 from Alesina et al. (2002). Social trust is the fraction of World Values Survey respondents
that agreed with the statement “Most people can be trusted” as compiled by Ashraf and Galor (2011).
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benchmark sample. Columns 4 to 6 repeat this analysis for our main civil conflict variable.
Once more, the coefficient value for Con f licti × A f rica falls in magnitude and lose signifi-
cance once we include social trust as a control. We again interpret this result with caution
due to the small sample for which these data are available. Still, this result suggests that
social trust may be one factor that mediates the relationship between historical warfare and
current civil conflict. Overall, this set of results support the evidence in Besley and Reynal-
Querol (2014), who find that a history of conflict in Africa decreases inter-group trust and
strengthens ethnic identify at the expense of national identity.
7 Conclusion
Do the consequences of historical warfare differ for Sub-Saharan Africa? To address this
question, we assemble new data on the locations of more than 1,500 conflicts in Africa, Asia,
and Europe from 1400 to 1799, which we use to test for the legacy of historical warfare on
state development.
Our results provide new evidence about where and when “war makes states.” Follow-
ing the typology of Besley and Persson (2011, 2015), our results suggest that historical war-
fare predicts “common-interest” states across much of the Old World, but predicts “special-
interest” states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our results are robust to a broad range of specifi-
cations, controls, and samples. We find that social trust is one mechanism that may help
explain why conflict persists in Sub-Saharan Africa. Taken together, this evidence suggests
that Sub-Saharan Africa is in fact different.
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Table 1: Conflicts by Century and Continent, 1400-1799
1400s 1500s 1600s 1700s Total Avg
Europe 261 220 232 97 810 203
Asia 148 181 93 101 523 131
Sub-Saharan Africa 21 61 90 58 230 58
North Africa 12 28 33 25 98 25
Total 442 490 448 281 1,661 415
Source: Brecke (1999).
Note: Number of conflicts that start in each century.
29
Table 2: Historical Warfare and Fiscal Capacity: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Direct Income Income Tax/GDP Direct Direct
tax share, tax share, tax bias, ratio, tax share, tax share,
1990-2000 1999 1999 1999 1990-2000 1990-2000
Conflict, 1400-1799 0.457*** 0.334** 0.426** 0.114 0.003*** 1.227***
(0.109) (0.161) (0.211) (0.088) (0.001) (0.347)
[0.000] [0.042] [0.048] [0.199] [0.001] [0.001]
Conflict x Africa 4.301*** 1.068** 1.611** -0.248 0.018*** 8.178***
(1.371) (0.428) (0.634) (0.253) (0.006) (2.819)
[0.003] [0.015] [0.014] [0.331] [0.004] [0.005]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Years Number Start
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.610 0.647 0.686 0.788 0.601 0.605
Observations 70 72 71 73 70 70
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include full set of fixed effects for continents
and country-level controls for log population density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic tran-
sition, log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
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Table 3: Persistence of Conflict: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Civil war Violence share Violence share Civil war Civil war
share, (ordered) (dummy) share, share,
1950-2000 1950-2000 1950-2000 1950-2000 1950-2000
Conflict, 1400-1799 0.055 0.337 0.284 -0.001* -0.341
(0.182) (0.349) (0.182) (0.001) (0.450)
[0.763] [0.336] [0.123] [0.090] [0.450]
Conflict x Africa 2.727** 4.961** 2.364** 0.014*** 6.206***
(1.210) (2.347) (1.121) (0.005) (2.281)
[0.026] [0.037] [0.037] [0.009] [0.008]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Number Start
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.259 0.284 0.317 0.276 0.272
Observations 116 113 113 116 116
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include full set of fixed effects for continents
and country-level controls for log population density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic tran-
sition, log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
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Table 4: Historical Warfare and Fiscal Capacity: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Direct tax share, 1990-2000
Conflict, 1400-1799 0.280** 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.436*** 0.530*** 0.443*** 0.381***
(0.136) (0.115) (0.116) (0.125) (0.185) (0.104) (0.130)
[0.044] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.007] [0.000] [0.005]
Conflict x Africa 4.535*** 4.135*** 4.383*** 4.616*** 4.064** 2.250* 2.985*
(1.387) (1.402) (1.470) (1.429) (1.767) (1.239) (1.573)
[0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.027] [0.075] [0.065]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Years Years Years Years
Country controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colonial origins No Yes No No No No Yes
Artificial borders No No Yes No No No Yes
Legal origins No No No Yes No No Yes
Other initial conditions No No No No Yes No No
Other geography No No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.530 0.624 0.640 0.617 0.674 0.689 0.724
Observations 75 70 65 70 49 70 65
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include full set of fixed effects for continents and
country-level controls for log population density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic transition, log land
suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. “Other initial conditions” are state antiquity in
1500 and technological adoption in 1500. “Other geography” are % pop at risk for malaria, % pop
living in tropical zones, avg dist to nearest waterway, avg dist to nearest coast, ruggedness, % desert,
and gem diamond extraction.
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Table 5: Persistence of Conflict: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Civil war share, 1950-2000
Conflict, 1400-1799 0.254 0.107 0.082 -0.018 -0.266 0.121 0.143
(0.161) (0.176) (0.196) (0.211) (0.303) (0.172) (0.209)
[0.116] [0.545] [0.675] [0.933] [0.385] [0.485] [0.497]
Conflict x Africa 2.791** 2.254* 2.605** 2.797*** 2.725* 2.642** 2.248*
(1.141) (1.229) (1.299) (1.025) (1.474) (1.200) (1.316)
[0.016] [0.070] [0.048] [0.007] [0.069] [0.030] [0.091]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Years Years Years Years
Country controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colonial origins No Yes No No No No Yes
Artificial borders No No Yes No No No Yes
Legal origins No No No Yes No No Yes
Other initial conditions No No No No Yes No No
Other geography No No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.206 0.356 0.250 0.281 0.300 0.340 0.372
Observations 132 116 108 116 76 116 108
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include full set of fixed effects for continents
and country-level controls for log population density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic transition,
log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. “Other initial conditions” are state
antiquity in 1500 and technological adoption in 1500. “Other geography” are % pop at risk for
malaria, % pop living in tropical zones, avg dist to nearest waterway, avg dist to nearest coast,
ruggedness, % desert, and gem diamond extraction.
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Table 6: Potential Bias from Unobservables
(1) (2)
Controls in Restricted Set Controls in Full Set
Direct tax Civil war
share, share,
1990-2000 1950-2000
Panel A: Conflict, 1400-1799
None Baseline controls -2.83 0.37
Baseline controls Colonial origins -188.25 -2.06
Baseline controls Legal origins 20.75 -0.24
Baseline controls Other initial conditions 17.09 -2.80
Baseline controls Other geography 30.71 -1.84
Panel B: Conflict x Africa
None Baseline controls 21.09 -202.09
Baseline controls Colonial origins 24.87 4.76
Baseline controls Legal origins -14.67 -40.26
Baseline controls Other initial conditions -36.35 34.69
Baseline controls Other geography 1.10 30.97
Note: Each cell reports ratio based on coefficients for Conflict, 1400-1799
(Panel A) or Conflict x Africa (Panel B) for two regressions. The first includes
covariates for “restricted” set of controls as listed; we label this coefficient
βˆr . The second includes covariates for “full” set of controls as listed; we
label this coefficient βˆ f . We compute the ratio as βˆ f /(βˆr − βˆ f ). “Baseline
controls” are log pop density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic transition, log
land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area. “Other initial
conditions” are state antiquity in 1500 and technological adoption in 1500.
“Other geography” are % pop at risk for malaria, % pop living in tropical
zones, avg dist to nearest waterway, avg dist to nearest coast, ruggedness,
% desert, and gem diamond extraction. All regressions include a full set of
fixed effects for continents.
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Table 7: Alternative Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Direct Civil war Direct Civil war Direct Civil war Direct Civil war
tax share, share, tax share, share, tax share, share, tax share, share,
1990-2000 1950-2000 1990-2000 1950-2000 1990-2000 1950-2000 1990-2000 1950-2000
Exclude 1700s No South Africa No China, Russia Include Americas
Conflict, 1400-1700 0.450*** -0.096
(0.089) (0.150)
[0.000] [0.524]
Conflict, 1400-1799 0.455*** 0.057 0.418*** 0.076 0.267* 0.082
(0.110) (0.181) (0.103) (0.206) (0.142) (0.170)
[0.000] [0.753] [0.000] [0.715] [0.064] [0.632]
Conflict x Africa 2.603*** 3.400*** 3.297*** 2.741** 3.830*** 2.316* 3.981*** 2.731**
(0.684) (0.783) (0.916) (1.229) (1.323) (1.171) (1.298) (1.230)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.028] [0.005] [0.051] [0.003] [0.028]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Years Years Years Years Years
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.618 0.294 0.632 0.262 0.620 0.320 0.446 0.232
Observations 70 116 69 115 69 114 88 141
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include full set of fixed effects for continents and country-level controls for log
population density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic transition, log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
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Table 8: Intermediate Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Log railway km, African conflict,
1910 1850-99
Conflict, 1400-1799 5.465*** 5.077*** 1.441** 1.159**
(1.102) (0.898) (0.618) (0.482)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.023]
Conflict x Africa -6.486* -3.139
(3.283) (5.071)
[0.054] [0.539]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Years
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes No No
Colonial origins No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.647 0.745 0.395 0.567
Observations 59 59 40 40
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include country-
level controls for log population density in 1500, log timing of Ne-
olithic transition, log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute lat-
itude, and area. Sample for regressions 1-2 is Old World; we thus in-
clude full set of fixed effects for continents. Sample for regressions 3-4
is Sub-Saharan Africa only; we thus exclude continental fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, followed by corresponding
p-values in brackets.
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Table 9: Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Direct tax share, Civil war share,
1990-2000 1950-2000
Conflict, 1400-1799 0.394*** 0.453*** 0.405*** 0.028 0.089 -0.026
(0.130) (0.110) (0.127) (0.191) (0.185) (0.154)
[0.004] [0.000] [0.003] [0.882] [0.630] [0.868]
Conflict x Africa 4.151*** 4.283*** 2.812 2.753** 2.570** 0.832
(1.163) (1.447) (1.814) (1.222) (1.225) (2.381)
[0.001] [0.004] [0.130] [0.026] [0.038] [0.728]
Conflict measure Years Years Years Years Years Years
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Democracy Yes No No Yes No No
Fractionalization No Yes No No Yes No
Trust No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.620 0.611 0.553 0.260 0.269 0.409
Observations 70 69 47 114 115 60
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include full set of fixed effects for conti-
nents and country-level controls for log population density in 1500, log timing of Neolithic
transition, log land suitability for agriculture, log absolute latitude, and area. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Share of years of conflict, 1400-1799 149 0.0720 0.126 0 0.729
Number of conflicts, 1400-1799 149 13.21 35.11 0 351
Share of years of conflict starts, 1400-1799 149 0.0279 0.0598 0 0.501
Average share of direct taxes in total taxes, 1990-2000 75 0.467 0.167 0.136 0.795
Share of income taxes in total taxes, 1999 84 0.380 0.196 0.0431 0.785
Income tax bias, 1999 83 0.205 0.318 -0.600 0.745
Total taxes to GDP, 1999 85 0.212 0.125 0.0280 0.520
Share of years of civil conflict, 1950-2000 132 0.126 0.231 0 1
Average share of political violence, 1945-2000 (ordered) 128 0.319 0.475 0 2
Average share of political violence, 1945-2000 (dummy) 128 0.190 0.251 0 1
Europe 149 0.309 0.464 0 1
Asia 149 0.329 0.471 0 1
North Africa 149 0.0403 0.197 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 149 0.322 0.469 0 1
Log population density, 1500 132 1.241 1.334 -1.939 4.135
Log timing of Neolithic revolution (millenia elapsed until 2000) 131 8.436 0.593 5.892 9.259
Log land suitability for agriculture 126 -1.616 1.440 -5.857 -0.186
Log absolute latitude 146 3.018 1.025 0 4.174
Land area (1,000,000 sq km) 149 0.552 1.604 1.95e-06 16.38
British colony 144 0.278 0.449 0 1
French colony 144 0.174 0.380 0 1
Portuguese colony 144 0.035 0.184 0 1
Spanish colony 144 0.014 0.117 0 1
Other European colony 144 0.042 0.201 0 1
British legal origins 146 0.260 0.440 0 1
French legal origins 146 0.432 0.497 0 1
Technology adoption, 1500 89 0.775 0.313 0 1
State antiquity, 1500 117 0.497 0.242 0.0280 0.964
Share of population at risk of malaria 132 0.357 0.443 0 1
Share of population share living in tropical zone 128 0.237 0.382 0 1
Average distance to nearest waterway (1,000 km) 128 0.365 0.475 0.0110 2.386
Average distance to nearest coast (1,000 km) 128 0.349 0.427 0 2.206
Terrain ruggedness 144 1.497 1.462 0.0116 6.740
Share of land that is desert 144 0.0424 0.125 0 0.773
Gem diamond extraction, 1958-2000 (1,000 carats/sq km) 144 5.761 28.46 0 208.7
Log railway km, 1910 62 7.386 1.775 2.197 11.11
Share of years of intra-African conflict, 1850-99 48 0.0771 0.126 0 0.580
Share of years of parliamentary democracy, 1945-2000 148 0.202 0.341 0 1
Ethnic fractionalization, 2001 139 0.462 0.266 0 0.930
Average trade openness, 1950-92 82 0.318 0.384 0 1
Average education, 1910-60 (years of schooling) 96 4.699 2.951 0.409 9.620
Social trust 70 0.282 0.135 0.049 0.664
Log per capita GDP, 2000 138 8.403 1.273 5.884 10.78
Sources: See text.
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Figure 1: Old World Conflict Locations, 1400-1799
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